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Social Network Markets and ‘Public Thought’ 
 
This paper approaches its topic in a somewhat crabwise manner, but hopefully by that means 
it may succeed in reaching its objective without being eaten alive. It comprises a critique of a 
recent internet post called ‘The Shock of Inclusion’ by Clay Shirky (his contribution to The 
Edge World Question of 2010), in which he claims (among other things) that ‘the average 
quality of public thought has collapsed.’ Shirky may have a point, but not necessarily in the 
way that he meant. Public thought has collapsed alright, but not because of the ‘here comes 
everybody’ (Shirky 2008) influx of amateur consumer-user-producers. The collapse is most 
evident among institutions and media forms that have traditionally represented public 
thought. Recent history suggests that such collapse has begun in three different 
expert/representative domains: academic (intellectual/literary), political (community) and 
journalistic (commercial) thought – in that order.  
 Instead of blaming the internet and the ‘shock of inclusion’ for the ‘end of civilisation 
as we know it’ as some academic, political and journalistic commentators do (and without 
necessarily disagreeing that this is where we’re heading), I take up the workshop’s theme of 
the ‘educational challenge’ that follows from near ubiquitous computing, connectivity, and 
content-sharing using digital media, in the context of the creative industries and creative 
innovation. However I do not confine ‘education’ to its current institutional form; rather, I’m 
interested in self-organising dynamic systems, and how they may develop their own 
‘endogenous learning institutions’ (if I may put it that way). In other words, how do 
emergent, disruptive, social networks teach their own users not only technical skills, but also 
imaginative possibilities, unthought-of applications, and effective integration into daily 
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routines and personal identity? And how do such systems, once established, contribute to the 
growth of knowledge? I also want to focus on the ‘self-made’ or consumer-created axis of 
this question, rather than turning immediately to the familiar focus on firms. The traditional 
distinction between producers and consumers is itself in process of dynamic change, so I 
don’t want to reinstate too quickly the perspective of ‘how to exploit your consumer market’ 
that Shirky himself adopts in his book Here Comes Everybody, which advises that the route 
to success for online enterprise is ‘a plausible promise, an effective tool, and an acceptable 
bargain with the users’ (Shirky 2008). Shirky is certainly on the money in the way this 
formula links technology (an effective tool) with its context of use – both imagination (a 
plausible promise) and sociality (an acceptable bargain). It is also clear from his qualifying 
terms – ‘plausible; effective; acceptable’ –  that he subscribes to what economists call 
‘satisficing’ or ‘bounded rationality,’ where decisions or choices are made in the absence of 
complete information. Thus the actions of firms must be reciprocal with those of consumers, 
who must be recruited rather than exploited.  In other words, both firms and consumers 
operate in an environment of social networks, both live and digital, and consumers are also 
causal agents in those networks. So I’m on the look-out for ways in which the productive 
potential of social networks may be ‘exploited’ by all the agents in the system, not just firms.  
 Instead of re-importing closed expert systems (or firms organised along industrial 
lines) by the back door, a learning mechanism exists in open complex networks, in the form 
of informal, self-organised and unmanaged social network markets. This term has been 
developed by researchers in the CCI to define the creative industries (Potts et al 2008). A 
‘social network market’ is one where choices are determined by the choices of others; where 
the important influences on choice include novelty, attention, signalling, status, copying, and 
heuristic solutions; and where ‘rational choice’ is an outcome of collective or networked 
relationships, rather than an individual input into the process. Also, because social network 
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markets coordinate the uptake and use of novelty, they generate new knowledge and thus 
value across many other domains, both cultural and economic. In this sense, the creative 
industries may be seen as the practical form taken by creativity as a social technology of 
innovation – one with ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ causation. 
 I offer an alternative to Shirky’s idea of an ‘Invisible College’ or Royal-Society-like 
association (Shirky 2010) to guide the growth of ‘public thought’ on the internet. I want to 
illustrate what we mean by ‘social network markets’ in the context of the organisation of 
‘public thought.’ Here I want to go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ in discussions of social 
networks – Web 2.0, Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook and Google – and turn instead to some 
unlikely-looking candidates: airport bestsellers, fashion media, and what I call the Eisteddfod 
Model of creative innovation. These neglected and often despised genres are all good 
examples of social network markets in the ‘economy of attention’ (Lanham 2006; Boyd 
2009: 99-112). Thus, airport bestsellers (both novels and non-fiction, especially business, 
self-help, popular science and technology books) give temporary and competitive prominence 
to certain ideas or creative innovations, and they also offer different forms of guidance to the 
self-publishing billions on the internet. Fashion media bundle infinite choices into 
meaningfulness, and distribute across whole populations the values associated with 
entrepreneurial risk: e.g. creative destruction (last season); the creation of new ideas 
(novelty); and rewards based on high-risk status (celebrity). The Eisteddfod Model uses an 
example from the analogue era (going back to pre-modern society) to show that social 
network markets predate digital media – and even modern capitalism – as self-organised 
systems for propagating and improving creative talent and new ideas among populations by 
means of competitive festivals.  
 In this paper I will only have time to mention one of these. 
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 The lesson I want to draw from these models is that we have become so preoccupied 
with familiar and often well-liked institutions (from news media all the way up to 
‘civilisation as we know it’), based on their representative expertise, that we are neglecting to 
identify the emergent institutional forms that mediate between systematic thought (e.g. 
disciplinary knowledge; specialist expertise; science) and popular, untutored public thought. 
Like Clay Shirky I am interested in the difference being made by digital literacy and the 
internet (Hartley 2009), in the face of which, according to Shirky, the familiar representative 
forms of ‘public thought’ – academic, political and journalistic – have indeed begun to 
‘collapse.’ In fact, a good way to test just how far that collapse has gone in each case might 
be to measure the intensity of the ‘culture of complaint’ (Hughes 1993) about loss of status 
by the erstwhile ‘beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a privileged 
activity’ (Shirky 2010). But instead of ‘keening’ about it (as Shirky puts it), I suggest that the 
generative edge of public thought is to be found at the point of interaction between the vast 
population of internet self-publishers and the competitive ideas in social network markets. 
 
Public Thought and Shirky’s Shock of Inclusion 
Clay Shirky’s ‘Shock of Inclusion’ on The Edge site was one of numerous contributions by 
various notables to the question for 2010: ‘How Has The Internet Changed The Way You 
Think?’ I really liked this short piece when I first read it, but there was also a niggling 
problem with it, which is what provoked this paper.  First, let me quote from what Shirky 
said. The paragraphs that made me think (my bolding) are these: 
This shock of inclusion, where professional media gives way to participation 
by two billion amateurs (a threshold we will cross this year) means that 
average quality of public thought has collapsed; when anyone can say 
anything any time, how could it not? If all that happens from this influx of 
amateurs is the destruction of existing models for producing high-quality 
material, we would be at the beginning of another Dark Ages. 
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The beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a 
privileged activity, whether academics or politicians, reporters or doctors, 
will complain about the way the new abundance of public thought upends the 
old order, but those complaints are like keening at a wake; the change 
they fear is already in the past. The real action is elsewhere. 
Given what we have today, the Internet could easily become Invisible High 
School, with a modicum of educational material in an ocean of narcissism 
and social obsessions. We could, however, also use it as an Invisible College, 
the communicative backbone of real intellectual and civic change, but to do 
this will require more than technology. It will require that we adopt norms of 
open sharing and participation, fit to a world where publishing has 
become the new literacy. 
 
The idea that most struck a chord was this one: that the ‘average quality of public thought has 
collapsed.’ Shirky probably meant this in a banal, arithmetic sense – given the same task (say, 
writing opinion columns in the press), two billion amateurs will score a lower individual 
average on any quality measure than a few experienced professional specialists. It seems 
therefore that he is conceding the more means worse argument (a classic manoeuvre of the 
educated Left),1 for he talks about ‘the shock of inclusion’ as (potentially) ‘another Dark 
Ages’ where ‘pancake people’ (widely-spread and thin)2 connect through ‘an ocean of 
narcissism and social obsessions.’  
 I’m not ready to concede that argument. It has no basis in either maths or in history. 
In terms of the maths, let’s say that among internet users, only a miniscule one in a thousand 
(0.1 percent) qualify as high (as opposed to ‘average’) ‘quality.’ Out of two billion users, that 
still amounts to two million quality creators – more than any previous mass medium could 
muster. Of course the real proportion will be much higher. When I first went to university, 
only 4 percent of the UK population were graduates; now it is more like 40 percent. Not all 
graduates are high quality, so let’s stick to the lower figure. Four percent of 2bn is 80 million 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. www.newstatesman.com/200103260019. 
2 See: www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/google/4. 
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– the population of Germany. Could you call participation by such numbers in ‘public 
thought’ a ‘collapse’? In terms of history, more of anything worthwhile has never meant 
worse – more education, healthcare, affluence, freedom, comfort, intellectual or 
entrepreneurial activity ... whatever .... has consistently resulted in, well, more. Growing up 
as a poor kid without a breadwinner in the family, I still had better dental care than Ramesses 
the Great,3 better education than the Queen of England (who never went to school),4 more 
intellectual freedom than the pope5... and so on. In short, extending once-priestly or royal 
privileges to everyone benefits ... everyone. Why would this not be true also of ‘public 
thought’? So let’s hear no more of the collapse of the ‘average quality of public thought’ in 
general.  
   
Sequence of Collapse 
None of this crossed my mind when I first read Shirky’s piece, however. I took him to mean 
something else, because my imagination was caught by that word ‘collapse.’ I took it to refer 
to the collapse of the existing system of ‘public thought’ and its replacement by the ‘influx of 
the amateurs’; i.e. that ‘the average quality of public thought has collapsed’ among the 
professional ‘thought class.’  
Changes brought on by the ‘abundance of public thought’ hit the academy long ago; more 
recently politics itself, and at last the commercial media too, especially those tied to 
industrial-era or broadcast platforms, are feeling the winds of change. This is what really got 
me excited about Shirky’s piece. It struck me that there is a sequence in the collapse of the 
‘average quality of public thought.’ If Shirky is right that change feared by the ‘beneficiaries 
                                                 
3 See: www.newscientist.com/article/mg18625061.900-why-the-pharaohs-never-
smiled.html?page=3. 
4 See: www.royal.gov.uk/HMTheQueen/Education/Overview.aspx. 
5 See: www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726452.000. 
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of the system where making things public was a privileged activity’ is ‘already in the past’ – 
then there must be a history – a causal sequence – of such change. If so, then ‘keening’ by 
‘beneficiaries’ may in fact be used as an indirect measure of the location, presence and 
intensity of change. Here’s what I would hypothesise on that topic: The collapse was first 
experienced in the academy (a proxy for intellectual and literary life); then in politics (a 
proxy for community or public life); then in journalism (a proxy for corporate interests in the 
copyright industries).  
1. Academic (intellectual/literary) collapse. Throughout the twentieth-century expansion of 
mass, modernist media, the social status of knowledge-professions, from doctors and 
academics to priests and teachers, steadily declined. As ‘the masses’ have benefitted 
from the expansion of knowledge, so the professions involved in its distribution or 
application, including scientists, engineers and designers, have proletarianised. The 
social prestige and political influence of the professoriate – as a class – has been in 
genteel decline, especially in the humanities, since WWII (probably earlier). To some 
extent the collapse was internal, as imperial-modernist certainties were challenged by 
successive waves of critical theory (structuralism, feminism, identity politics, relativism, 
deconstruction, constructivism, postmodernism), critiquing the knowledge-power nexus 
and disputing the truth-claims of science. In recent decades this precipitated open 
hostility towards the academic left in the so-called culture wars.  
 
Literary intellectuals responsible for ‘public thought’ were once proud to carry the moral, 
political and aesthetic conscience of empires on their shoulders – Kipling (Nobel laureate 
for Literature) called it the White Man’s Burden6 and Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch (King 
                                                 
6 See: www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/. 
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Edward VII Professor of English at Cambridge) called it Noblesse oblige.7 Now they are 
reduced to an ambition for satisfactory impact metrics – among which forming the taste 
and judgement of future leaders does not appear. The ‘keening’ of the remaining 
professors surfaces periodically in The Times Higher Education Supplement, Times 
Literary Supplement, etc. 
Meanwhile, the trained expertise upon which our discipline’s vestigial claims to a public 
platform might have been based has steadily been eroded by the increasingly obvious 
fact that such expertise is neither scarce nor valuable – everyone is an ‘expert’ on popular 
culture; and few want to pay for knowledge about ‘ordinary’ life. Now, we may be able 
to produce high-quality ‘public thought’ on our specialist topic; but it’s so micro, arcane 
and impenetrable that ... there’s no public paying attention, so who cares? 
2. Political (community) collapse. ‘Public thought’ on the question of ‘Are we all going to 
die?’ ended with the end of the Cold War internationally and capitalist/ socialist 
struggles internally. As the danger of Mutually Assured Destruction (by weapons or 
workers) faded, politics became purer; that is, more abstract, not about anything except 
adversarial opposition itself. Robert Hughes (1993) called the result the Culture of 
Complaint. The USA became, he wrote, ‘obsessed with therapies and filled with distrust 
of formal politics; sceptical of authority and prey to superstition; its political language 
corroded by fake pity and euphemism.’ Excessive politicisation corrupts: ‘Polarization is 
addictive. It is the crack of politics – a short, intense rush that the system craves again 
and again, until it begins to collapse.’8  
                                                 
7 See: www.bartleby.com/190/8.html. 
8 See: www.scottlondon.com/reviews/hughes.html. 
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The ‘quality’ of political  ‘public thought’ nosedives. Instead of looking for reds under 
the beds, we’re looking for child molesters – or teenage tearaways. Someone to blame 
for our continuing sense of risk in conditions of unprecedented security. 
3. Journalism (commercial) collapse. It’s the Economy, Stupid. Here’s where Clay Shirky 
gets interested; not when professions or politics suffer systemic collapse, but when 
business plans are threatened. The principal large-scale ‘beneficiaries of the system 
where making things public was a privileged activity’ were of course publishers – of 
songs, sights, and stories. That is, the music business, broadcasting and the movies, the 
press, and publishing – the existing copyright industries.  
The one bit of this sector of the economy where ‘public thought’ was linked directly to 
private enterprise was journalism (loosely defined, i.e. including opinion, commentary, 
features and PR). It’s not just individual firms; whole industries are crumbling, business 
models don’t work ... hey, it’s the end of civilisation as we know it!  
So now journalism has something to campaign about in which its own fate is implicated. 
It’s back to the good old days of ‘are we all going to die?’ ... but now the ‘we’ is a plc. 
The campaign is not confined to editorials, the op-ed pages and features, but permeates 
so-called hard news too. Journalism as a whole is geared up to turn ‘public thought’ into 
a culture of complaint ... about piracy.  
Along the way, editors are quite happy to stage front-page news reports that white-ant 
their online rivals in ‘making things public,’ by whatever pretext that comes to hand: ‘A 
massive spike in violent attacks by young Queensland girls has been blamed on the 
internet...’ (Courier Mail). Here is where we are now: the latest outbreak of ‘keening’ is 
by commercial creators, manufacturers and disseminators (up to and including Rupert 
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Murdoch, see Thomson 2010) and their freelance-consultant allies, like Andrew Keen 
(The Cult of the Amateur).9  
Here comes 
everybody
 
Leicester Square, London, October 2009 (Pic: Author) 
 
An Invisible College – At the Airport? 
But if Shirky is right, the complaints of these successive ‘beneficiaries’ of making thought 
public are simply evidence that it is already too late for Keen’s ‘keening’; the ‘real action is 
elsewhere’. I think he is right. And I know where the real action is. It’s at the airport.  
 I’m thinking of the airport in relation to long-haul flights in particular (from recent 
experience), where time-zones, jetlag, transit lounges and complete subjection to the will of 
others relativises everything, from your circadian rhythms to your experience of time, place, 
self and society. That grey hub of artificially induced docility fails to mask the realities of 
uncertainty and risk, where no-one is at home (in equilibrium) but everyone visits some time, 
myriad agents bent on different but mutually accommodating ends, finding ways to suspend 
time and live in pure relativism.  
                                                 
9 See: andrewkeen.typepad.com/ajkeenbooks/.  
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 Airports are perhaps the best physical manifestation we have of humanity’s skill in 
developing social-network infrastructure; they’re an analogue version of the ‘packet 
switching’ that enables the internet to function. Here we come to the last bit of the Shirky 
piece that I quoted at the beginning of this one: 
We could, however, also use it [the Internet] as an Invisible College, the 
communicative backbone of real intellectual and civic change, but to do this will 
require more than technology. It will require that we adopt norms of open sharing 
and participation, fit to a world where publishing has become the new literacy. 
Shirky favours a latter-day ‘Invisible College,’ a term he borrows from the precursor to the 
Royal Society. This was the network of experimental inquiry and open argumentation that we 
now call science, which was established among early-modern chemists in Europe.10 I support 
his sentiment that a world where everyone is a publisher may drive progressive intellectual 
and civic change; and like him I am interested in ways of organising and sharing knowledge 
outside of formal institutions.  In fact I wrote a book on these topics (Hartley 2009). 
However, I do not subscribe to Shirky’s idea of an Invisible College. His talk of an ‘influx of 
amateurs’ and ‘another Dark Ages’ has made me suspicious. If the Invisible College is just a 
few self-selected savants, for instance the mutually congratulatory luminaries gathered on 
The Edge website itself, it smacks of Brave New World, not to mention the latter-day 
Illuminati.11 
 But if, at the other extreme, it is taken to be the internet as a whole (‘here comes 
everybody’), then such a vast system-of-systems cannot hope to achieve purposeful change, 
even if it is called for from within the ranks of users themselves. In the face of his own vision 
of near-universal participation, his nerve fails: ‘Given what we have today, the Internet could 
easily become Invisible High School, with a modicum of educational material in an ocean of 
                                                 
10 See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_College. 
11 See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illuminati. 
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narcissism and social obsessions.’ He creates an adversarial system – the Invisible High 
School versus the Invisible College; one displays ‘narcissism and social obsessions’; the 
other an ethic of ‘open sharing and participation.’ Of course, the immediate question is: 
what’s the difference between these two? And why set up yet another boring ‘elite’ vs ‘mass’ 
model of knowledge creation? The real challenge is to see how both ‘narcissism and social 
obsession’ and ‘open sharing and participation in creative innovation and the pursuit of 
knowledge (new ideas) can be understood as part of the same system, and extended across 
whole populations. This would be a truly evolutionary approach to the growth of knowledge. 
 What then might be a model for directed, educative change, including ‘open sharing 
and participation’ among any if not all Netizens, in the iterative improvement of contested 
knowledge (... i.e. science), as a self-organising, grass-roots approach to knowledge transfer, 
so as to use the emergent productive capacity of the internet to best effect?  
 The answer is staring us in the face. What does everybody do at airports? They buy 
books to read on planes. The Invisible College is ... airport bestsellers. Such books belong to 
a peculiar genre. They must fit in with the realities of air travel: long but not too long, 
absorbing and narratively compelling, not like work ... and extremely well promoted, 
branded, and celebrity-endorsed, because travellers must be able to choose on the fly, as it 
were, without access to their habitual feedback loops. Most such books are novels; but 
significant sub-genres exist in non-fiction, including business, popular science, history and 
biography. The whole point of them is that they address non-specialist, ordinary readers with 
other priorities and purposes. They address the general public, which is thereby constituted in 
the form of a constantly changing but continuously replenished market. 
 Please note that almost all of the ‘digital literati’ lambasted by Andrew Keen, along 
with Andrew Keen and Clay Shirky themselves, are authors of non-fiction bestsellers, the 
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ideal-type of which is the business book you buy at the airport. Where once these clustered 
around the prating of alpha males (Jack Welch syndrome), there is now a sizeable segment 
devoted to digital topics, often by (or co-authored with) those who’ve made some money. 
Indeed, such books are part of the definition of the ‘digerati’:    
The ‘digital elite.’ People who are extremely knowledgeable about computers. It often 
refers to the movers and shakers in the industry. Digerati is the high-tech equivalent 
of ‘literati,’ which refers to scholars and intellectuals, or ‘glitterati,’ the rich and 
famous. Digerati, ‘technorati’ and ‘geekerati’ are synonymous. See Technorati and 
Illuminati.12 
The airport bestseller is the book most likely to be cited by high-profile controversialists (like 
Andrew Keen or Clay Shirky) as they conduct their online arguments. It is the common 
currency of communication about the internet among the diverse and multivalent, not to say 
mobile and shifting, population of non-specialist readers. It is the medium of instruction for 
the ‘influx of amateurs’ – a readily available resource that they can turn to for inspiration. 
Needless to say, this being the age of the internet, anyone can write one. eHow for instance 
gives good advice, but notice that it does require more than mere specialist knowledge and 
even good wordcraft (Step 2: ‘succeed in business’). Note also that Step 4 is promotion – 
‘simple market forces’ (i.e. Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’)13  need a helping hand from 
marketing.14 
 
Improving and Extending the Quality of Public Thought 
The problem of the ‘quality of public thought’ is solved. In the first place, those who have 
followed the advice above – from Eric Beinhocker (The Origin of Wealth) to the 
                                                 
12 See: www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=geekerati&i=41273,00.asp. 
 
13 See: plus.maths.org/issue14/features/smith. 
14 See Schumpeter on marketing’s centrality: www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/MCCPRI.html. 
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Freakonomics guys – tend to write really good books. ‘Quality’ is condensed into the simple 
and unarguable form of sales data: if it’s a bestseller, it’s a good idea (until it is overturned by 
a subsequent bestseller). This system feeds on itself: if I’ve heard the buzz I’ll buy the book. 
 Conversely,  if you academic experts – drear drudges of dismal data – have done 
nothing more than master your subject, perfect your methodology, and discover something 
new, then bad luck. You won’t compete until you’ve caught the eye of public attention, as 
Richard Lanham and Brian Boyd have both stressed ... in their own airport bestsellers (The 
Economics of Attention and On the Origin of Stories). Promotion, including celebrity-status, 
attention-seeking antics, polemical attacks and controversies, turns out to be of crucial 
importance to the propagation of knowledge.  Mere expertise runs a distant second. The 
airport bestseller is thus a signalling mechanism.  
 This takes us beyond the ‘shock of inclusion.’ The initial phase of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction ‘upends the old order’ (as Shirky puts it). The existing ‘beneficiaries of 
the system where making things public was a privileged activity’ are dethroned. However 
they don’t disappear – perforce, they regroup, trying to adapt to the new circumstances. But 
the ‘real action’ is happening over at the airport. Here we can observe the emergence of a 
new order – a market in ideas for busy, mobile, half-attentive but motivated and self-directing 
consumer-agents. This market also establishes a pecking order among opinion-formers, who 
are the true educators of the ‘here comes everybody’ era.  
 Airport bestsellers do for tradable ideas what newspapers once did for nations, and 
what universities are still supposed to do – they create a public for new knowledge, and they 
sort the ideas according to their uptake among that public. This process, of differential 
uptake, is what we might once have called education and even intellectual emancipation, 
except that now it is self-directed, demand-led, and self-organising.  
16 
 
 Of course, it’s not entirely online. The ‘shock of inclusion’ proceeds in multiplatform 
mode. There is plenty of online chatter about the latest offerings, and many of the best titles 
are (legally) available online in their entirety (Leadbeater’s We-Think; Zittrain’s The Future 
of the Internet ... and How to Stop It). But these books have to take physical form too; else 
why do we have Amazon ... or airports, come to that?  
 Clay Shirky says that ‘publishing has become the new literacy’ – and I agree with 
him. I’ve claimed that ‘journalism is a human right’ (i.e. that in a democracy, everyone is a 
journalist – they can publish as well as hold opinions; broadcast as well as know facts); and I 
also agree that the internet marks the biggest step-change in the growth of knowledge-
technologies since Gutenberg. But we don’t yet know how to harness all the new ‘public 
thought’ that’s already out there. Much of it is dismissed as idle chatter, or what the linguists 
call ‘phatic’ communication, designed to keep in contact – which means to attract attention – 
rather than to communicate thought.15 We know even less about how to stimulate, improve or 
propagate its ‘quality’ (this is the problem that the Eisteddfod model is designed to address).  
 In this context, the argy-bargy of complaint, controversy and keening should not be 
taken at face value. It is not important to decide on a winner or loser among all the 
arguments, nor to agree with this or that commentator. Instead, note the importance of 
signalling in the propagation of public thought. If you want to get an idea across, get 
attention. If you want attention, keep the lines of communication open. Thus, the rhetoric of 
polemical argument itself performs a phatic function (like eighty percent of internet traffic). 
It’s going ... ‘Look at me!’16  
 The lesson we should be learning is that mechanisms for extending and improving the 
quality of public thought exist – airport bestsellers as Invisible College; and other examples 
                                                 
15 See: www.signosemio.com/jakobson/a_fonctions.asp. 
16 See: www.austrade.gov.au/Exports-Beckon-Look-At-Moi-Look-At-Moi-/default.aspx. 
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we haven’t had time to explore today. The readership is proving both able and willing to take 
advice. It may take a while, but so did the real impact of print, which took about 150 years to 
emerge. However, we can see here a model for propagation and improvement of popular 
public thought. What we don’t have yet is a mechanism from extending the system beyond 
readerships. Here there is plenty of room for improvement. The internet is populated by a 
much larger public than the one captured by the readership of even the most popular 
bestseller. Lots of people out there don’t read books at all, but they do count among Shirky’s 
two billion.  
 So the question is: How to reach out to everybody? If there has been a ‘collapse of 
public thought’ (among academics, public representatives and commercial media) it is in the 
willingness of all of them to exclude non-specialist, amateur, ordinary consumers altogether; 
or to assume that empty chatter (phatic entertainment) is enough for the likes of them. It 
would be a big – epochal – mistake to imagine the internet in the same terms, making an 
invidious distinction between what Shirky calls ‘the Invisible College’ (Hooray!) and ‘an 
ocean of narcissism and social obsessions’ (Boo!), not only because we’re slow to recognise 
the same elements in our own ‘public thought,’ but also because we know in advance which 
way many users will choose to jump. The existing organs of public enlightenment (the 
professional beneficiaries of ‘making things public’) have lost popular attention; the internet 
still has it. The educational challenge is to start from there.  
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